SECURITY MODEL
Security Model
How AegisAI holds control, what it makes verifiable, and where the boundary between the model and governance begins.
THREAT CLASSES
Prompt Injection
Adversarial input designed to override policy, escalate privilege, or extract data through the model channel.
Control: LLM output enters an adapter that produces a typed, schema-validated ProposalSpec. The Kernel treats this as an untrusted proposal — not a command. Policies apply before any action can proceed.
Audit Record Tampering
Attempts to delete, modify, or forge governance records to erase evidence of unauthorized actions.
Control: Every DecisionTrace carries a SHA-256 custody_hash (Class B chain integrity). Class A: Ed25519-signed attestation provides external verifiability when configured. Neither can be retroactively altered without breaking the chain.
Policy Bypass
Exploiting an edge case, race condition, or misconfiguration to allow a HIGH-severity action without an explicit ALLOW.
Control: HIGH-severity violations produce BLOCK by design — this is a hard invariant, not a default. Verified by the benchmark gate on every CI run: security_failures == 0 required.
Loss of Control
System enters an unpredictable or unrecoverable state during adversarial conditions or unexpected inputs.
Control: Panic mode: global hard stop across all transitions. No reasoning loop, no degraded mode. The Kernel freezes until a signed recovery probe is provided.
CRYPTOGRAPHIC TRUST MODEL
AegisAI operates a two-class trust model. Understanding the distinction matters for any external audit or governance proof requirement.
- →Ed25519 signature over the finalized DecisionTrace
- →Artifact:
DecisionTraceAttestation - →Verifiable by any party holding the public key — no Kernel access required
- →Produced only when
AEGIS_SIGNING_KEYis configured
- →SHA-256
custody_hashon every DecisionTrace - →HMAC-SHA256 chain linking records — tamper-detection only
- →Always present — the Class B chain is never optional
- →Internal only: HMAC key never crosses the external trust boundary
Key rule: A DecisionTrace without a corresponding DecisionTraceAttestation is an internal record only. Its Class B chain is intact, but it carries no external governance proof. Absence of attestation ≠ absence of governance.
FAIL-SAFE CONTROL PATH
Panic Mode
Global hard stop. All kernel transitions blocked. No reasoning loop, no degraded mode. The system freezes until a signed recovery probe is presented and validated.
effect: block all transitions
recovery: signed_probe required
Break-Glass Override
One-time, targeted administrative override for emergency scenarios. Requires an Ed25519 signature and a specific correlation_id. Replay protection enforced — each override token is valid exactly once.
requires: Ed25519 signature
scope: single correlation_id
HARD INVARIANTS
NON-GOALS
AegisAI is a policy control plane, not a general-purpose AI system or security perimeter.
DEPLOYMENT MODES
Sidecar
Policy enforcement layer alongside an existing system. Intercepts proposals before action dispatch.
API Gateway
Centralised adjudication across multiple upstream models via a single governance endpoint.
SDK (Embedded)
Inline enforcement within application code. Kernel instantiated per session with a policy bundle.